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Introduction 
 
The Cold War between the Soviet Union and the Unite States of America found its 
end with the dissolution of the Soviet bloc and Warsaw Pact at the beginning of 
1990s. This was considered by Francis Fukuyama, one of the world prominent 
scholars, as the “End of History” and mainly understood the permanent victory of 
the “liberal democracy” or the US hegemony over the rest of the world, and end of 
power politics (Fukuyama, 1992). However, the collapse of the Soviet Union paved 
the way to the emerging of new independent states, strategically important regions 
in the map of the Eurasia. Consequently, confrontation of the world great powers 
took place with entering new political and security issues on the stage of 
international power politics. One of those regions that have been forgotten by the 
outside world during Soviet Union was the Caspian region, which was considered 
as a potential energy sources and strategically pivotal area of the Eurasia that 
emerged out of the political chaos of 1990s.  
Ever since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Caspian region has been 
transformed into the battleground and the power confrontations of the world major 
leading countries not only because of its geo-strategic position in the map of the 
Eurasia, but also because of its immense hydrocarbon resources. Concerning the 
importance of the Caspian region, the former Vice President of the Bush 
administration, Dick Cheney, emphasized during his speech to oil industrialists in 
Washington, D.C. in 1998, “I cannot think of a time when we have had region 
emerge as suddenly to become as strategically significant as the Caspian” 
(Kleveman, 2004: p. 4). 
The geographical location of the Caspian region and possessing vast amount of oil 
and gas resources led it to play a significant role in world energy security and drew 
the attention of the regional and global players in order to increase their stocks in 
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exploitation and transportation of Caspian hydrocarbon. The discovery of big 
amount of oil and gas in the Caspian led the Western politicians to project the 
Caspian region as a “New Middle East” (Kumar, 2009: p. 9).Therefore, the scope 
of this research paper is to evaluate the geo-strategic significance of the Caspian 
region and its role as a crucial link between East and West, as well as examine the 
geopolitical rivalry over the vast Caspian region hydrocarbons and the 
transportation routes (pipeline politics) between the three global powers; Russia, 
the United States, and China. Lately, it will analyze what policies do these big 
states pursue in order to impose their political influence and ensuring economic 
benefits.  
 
Theoretical Approach: The Caspian Region and the “New Great Game” 
As the geopolitical importance of the Caspian region increased and its hydrocarbon 
resources became the subject of interests various scholarships were dedicated to the 
study of the Caspian region history and development of its oil industry, role of the 
Caspian hydrocarbons in the world energy security, power rivalries over the control 
of the Caspian region, pipelines politics etc. There are numerous publications in 
order to find out that what is the Caspian Region as a geographical area and which 
countries have to be referred into this geo-strategic region. As a new geographical 
term the Caspian region draws the scholarly attention after the break-up the Soviet 
Union in the last decade of the twentieth century. In academic level, there is a great 
debate whether it consists of only the littoral states of the Caspian Sea or as a 
geopolitical and geo-strategic term it possesses wider region. Geographically, the 
Caspian region consists of the five littoral states: Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, 
Russia, and Turkmenistan. However, in the geopolitical meaning the term can 
hardly be used to restrict with the littoral states of the Caspian Sea. There are 
various opinions referring to the term Caspian region. One of them is, as a 
geopolitical term, the region consists of wider territory on the border of Europe and 
Asia, known as a “Eurasian Pearl”(Zeinolabedin, et all., 2009: p. 116), and joins 
two regions of the former Soviet Union, Caucasus and Central Asia (Zeinolabedin, 
et all., 2011: p. 504). Other scholars referring to the first opinion apply the term 
Caspian region to the republics of Central Asian and South Caucasus; also include 
Pakistan, Afghanistan and even Middle East to this region (Sasley, 2004: p. 194). 
Mustafa Aydin, one of the prominent Turkish scholars on the Caspian Studies, in 
his turn, identifies the Caspian region as follows: 
The Caspian Region is centered on that inland body of water that is called a sea 
because of its size and includes five independent states that surround it: Russia, 
Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Iran. The contemporary usage of the term 
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‘the Caspian Region’, in a wider geopolitical sense, implies a ‘geopolitics determined 
by peculiarities of geology, [that is] huge natural resources’, which has led to the 
formation of ‘a region defined by oil’ and gas. The result is the emergence of a new 
strategic region encompassing most of Central Asia, the North Caucasus and 
Transcaucasia as well as such nearby states as Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan 
and even China. Thus the Caspian Region, connecting two distinct areas of the 
former Soviet Union, the Caucasus and Central Asia... (2004: p. 3). 
Following theabove mentioned ideas of the various scholars, this research paper is 
going to deal with the geopolitical importance of the Caspian Sea, which can be 
also identified as “Greater Caspian Region”, located in the central part of Eurasia 
(Eurasian Heartland) and connects economically and politically significant regions 
of world, such as: Middle East, Europe, South and East Asia (Kaliyeva, 2004: p.1). 
As mentioned before, the geopolitical and geo-economic significance of the 
Caspian region played a crucial role for drawing the attention of the regional and 
global powers in order to dominate the region and impose their political will over 
the Caspian region countries. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, presence of 
vast amount of hydrocarbon resources and situating in the center of the Eurasian 
continent changed the strategic importance of the Caspian region and provided the 
political and economic competition between global powers, namely; Russia, China, 
and the USA. This power confrontation reached a new level after the terrorist 
attack on the US soil, on the 11 September 2001. Ever since that event, United 
States decided to intensify its military presence in the Caspian region and began a 
military cooperation with the newly independent Caspian region states 
(Laruelle&Peyrouse, 2009: p. 29). This attempt was considered by Russia as the 
direct threat to the Russian political and economic interests in its “Near Abroad”. 
With the intensification of energy, security, and economic interests of the big 
powers to the Caspian region it transformed to be the core of the “New Great 
Game” (Imani, 2009: p. 60). As MehdiParviziAmineh, prominent scholar on the 
Caspian Energy, indicates, “with the end of the Soviet control over CEA and the 
Caspian region natural and human resources, there emerged a New Great Game 
amongst the many players interested in access to the region’s oil and gas 
reserves...”(Parvizi, 2003: p. 209). Despite the differences in the scope, ideas, and 
the parties of the New Great Game over the Caspian region, the analogy is made by 
political analysts between this great power rivalry and the nineteenth century 
“Great Game” between British and Russian empires over access to India (Smith, 
2009). Regarding this, Lutz Kleveman in his famous book The New Great Game: 
Blood and Oil in Central Asia, elucidates:  
Now, more than hundred years later, great empires once again position themselves to 
control the heart of the Eurasian landmass, left in a post-Soviet power vacuum. Today 
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there are different actors and the rules of the new neocolonial game are far more 
complex than those of a century ago: The United States has taken over the leading 
role from the British. Along with the ever-present Russians, new regional powers 
such as China, Iran, Turkey and Pakistan have entered the new arena… (2004: p. 2). 
According to him, “the greatest differences in today's Great Game are the spoils. 
While in the Victorian-era struggle, London and St. Petersburg competed over 
access to the riches of India, the New Great Game focuses on the Caspian energy 
reserves, principally oil and gas” (Kleveman, 2004: p. 3). 
The term “Great Game” is usually attributed to British East India Company 
intelligence officer Arthur Conolly (Kleveman, February 2004), but was originally 
coined by British novelist R. Kipling and mostly describes the power competition 
between Russia and Great Britain in the nineteenth century over the hegemony of 
Central Asia (Rasizade, 2002: p. 125). However, there was an argument that the 
intention of the Great Game was not only Central Asia, it was a gateway to 
Afghanistan and India (Cooley, 2008), and Britain was aware that if Russia 
established its control over Central Asia, it would be easy for it to penetrate into its 
colonial India. Therefore, due to its geo-strategic position and according to the 
Great Game narratives, Central Asia is an important pivotal area and has been the 
ground of intense rivalry among the great power for centuries.  
Sir Halford Mackinder also introduced the significance of Central Asia in his 
famous Heartland concept. Mackinder’s Heartland theory dates back over a 
century.He first defined his theory with respect to “The Geographical Pivot of 
History” in 1904 and then articulated in his famous book Democratic Ideals and 
Reality in 1919, where the pivotal area of Eurasia introduced as Heartland and 
considered the most significant area of the world in terms of geo-strategy (İşeri, 
2009: p. 33). The Heartland theory of Mackinder covers much of today's Russia, 
mainly Siberia, and Central Asia, and later of the Central-East Europe 
(BogdanVlad, 2010: p. 118) which is presented in the map below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The ―New Great Gameǁ Over the Caspian Region: Russia, the USA, and China…         33 
 
Mackinder's Pivot Area (Mackinder, 1904) 
By this theory Mackinder was supporting the importance of the control over the 
vast Eurasian landmass and tried to show the declining naval power of Britain, 
which has been the dominant power in the open seas for centuries. In this regards, 
he introduces his famous Heartland concept as following words, “Who rules East 
Europe commands the Heartland; Who rules the Heartland commands the World-
Island; Who rules the World-Island commands the World” (Brzezinski, 1997: p. 
38). According to his idea, industrially well-developed land-based powers could 
control the Eurasian landmass (İşeri, 2009: p. 33). Concerning Heartland concept 
of Mackinder, ZbigniewBrzezinsky in his famous book The Grand Chessboard 
elucidates: 
Geopolitics was also invoked by some leading German political geographers to 
justify their country's “DrangnachOsten”, notably with Karl Haushofer adapting 
Mackinder's concept to Germany's strategic needs. Its much-vulgarized echo could 
also be heard in Adolf Hitler's emphasis on the German people's need for 
“Lebensraum (1997: p. 39). 
Consequently, I consider Heartland theory of Mackinder overlap the term Caspian 
region that has been mentioned above. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union the 
Caspian region states declared their independence, and due to their geo-strategic 
position these states reconstitute the modern core of Mackinder's concept and there 
is still a political rivalry over the Heartland that he introduce a century ago. 
However, this time great powers are not fighting for the control of the Caspian 
region due to its geographical position as a gateway to the immense natural 
resources of Afghanistan and India, but also for the huge hydrocarbon resources of 
the Caspian region itself. Therefore, in this part it is important to stress briefly the 
main causes of the political rivalry between the above mentioned three global 
powers and then analyzes their intentions and perspectives on the Caspian region 
broadly in the following pages. The essence of this gamble over the Caspian region 
is twofold: 
Economic and Energy Issue: As mentioned before, the Caspian region occupies a 
central position in the Eurasian landmass and this geographical possession is 
important because of connecting traditional East/West and North/South trade 
routes. At the same time this region possesses vast amounts of natural resources, 
mainly oil and gas, which is considered an alternative to the Middle East energy. 
While stressing the importance of the Caspian region energy resources, Energy 
Secretary of the US, Bill Richardson notes, “The Caspian region will hopefully 
save us from total dependence on Middle East oil” (Goldberg, 1998). It possesses a 
high amount of proven and possible energy resources. Estimation is that proven oil 
34  Shamkhal Abilov 
 
is between 10 and 32 billion barrels with 233 billion barrel possible oil reserves 
(Bhadrakumar, 2005). Coming to the gas, it is estimated in 243-248 trillion cubic 
feet proven and 293 trillion cubic feet possible gas (Molchanov&Yevdokimov, 
2004: p. 418).Therefore, one of the main reasons that the US, Russia, and China 
involved to the political rivalry in the Caspian region is due to access the rich 
energy resources, control oil and gas production and the transportation pipelines 
that transfer the hydrocarbon resources to the world market. 
Political and Security Issue: Nevertheless, access to the rich energy resources is 
considered the main reason, but it is not only motive that great powers engaged 
rivalry. All three powers have political and security interests in the Caspian region. 
The New Great Game has gained a new manner with the US penetration into the 
Caspian region after the 9/11 events. The US sees the Caspian region as an 
important area for its geo-strategy as it connected with its position in the Middle 
East. Russian concerns are the ethnic and territorial disputes in its “New Abroad” 
and Russian citizens in these countries. China in its turn was worried about the 
security issue in its Xingjian province, which has the direct territorial link with the 
Caspian region. 
 
United States in the Caspian Region 
Over the last two decades the United States of America has been one of the crucial 
players of the New Great Game in the Caspian region. With the demise of the 
Soviet Union the bipolar world system that domination the Cold War era was 
disappeared and witnessed emerging United States as the only influential global 
power. By announcing Caspian as a vital strategic interest, US began to play active 
role in the political and economic affairs of the region. It was pushing itself into the 
region and takes all efforts to avoid rivalry and prevent formation of any political 
allies that challenge its position. The US was trying to expand its political relations 
with the region countries and established bilateral relations with them for 
protecting security in the region. Meanwhile, it sets a strategy for the involvement 
to the energy policy of Caspian states. By this, the primary goal of the US was to 
keep its initiative in the region and create a new sphere of influence in the Eurasian 
Heartland in order to obtain a broader security system that can maintain its political 
and economic dominance in the regional and international lever. For implementing 
its global strategy in the Caspian region it was trying to contain the influence of 
other world powers to the region and control political and economic affairs over the 
Eurasian Heartland that overlap with the aforementioned classical geopolitical 
concept of Mackinder. In this regard, VassilidFouskas and BulentGokay describe 
the US policy toward the region as follows:  
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As the only superpower remaining after the dismantling of the Soviet bloc, the 
United States is inserting itself into the strategic regions of Eurasia and anchoring US 
geopolitical influence in these areas to prevent all real and potential competitions 
from challenging its global hegemony. The ultimate goal of US strategy is to 
establish new spheres of influence and hence achieve a much firmer system of 
security and control that can eliminate any obstacles that stand in the way of 
protecting its imperial power. The intensified drive to use US military dominance to 
fortify and expand Washington’s political and economic power over much of the 
world has required the reintegration of the post-Soviet space into the US-controlled 
world economy. The vast oil and natural gas resources of Eurasia are the fuel that is 
feeding this powerful drive, which may lead to new military operations by the United 
States and its allies against local opponents as well as major regional powers such as 
China and Russia (2005: p. 29). 
As indicated before, the Caspian region is perceived as a vital interest and a 
strategic sector for the US because of two major elements; energy and security. The 
former is driven from the US policy to diversify its energy sources in order to 
decrease its dependence from Middle East oil and the former one related to its 
policy of “war on terrorism” in Afghanistan (ZeynepOktav, 2005: p. 31). Some 
politicians also view spread of democracy, promote human rights, civil liberties, 
and free and fair elections in the region as one of the main goal of US in the region 
(Weitz, 2006: p. 160). However, “democratization” is a political tool that helps US 
intervention to political and economic affairs of the weak region states easily in 
order to preserve its above-mentioned primary interests.  
In March 1997, National Security Advisor of Clinton Administration Sandy Berger 
pointed the region as one of the primary objects of the US foreign policy. Same 
year, in July, the Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott indicated that “by active 
engagement in the Caspian region, in energy issues as well as security matters, the 
USA sent a clear signal to the world that priority would be given to increasing US 
influence there even over safeguarding the US “partnership” with Russia” (Jonson, 
2001: p. 19). 
Proceeding from all of these we can set up policy priority tasks of US toward the 
Caspian region after the demise of Soviet Union as follows, to access the great 
energy potential of the region and ensure its control over the transportation routs; to 
prevent the regional powers, mainly China and Russia, from gaining any kind of 
economic and geopolitical advantage in the region; to build bilateral and 
multilateral political and economic relation with the regional countries; to prevent 
region from becoming a military base for extremist forces and deploy its military 
forces into the region in order to fight against terrorism and guarantee its security 
from terrorist threat. The reason why this research first focuses on the US 
perspectives and interests toward the Caspian is because for the last two decades 
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the US has been the most active player of the New Great Game in the Caspian 
region, and Russia and China are in a defense position to set their policy 
concerning the region as a counter strike against the US policy. 
Energy security has been always one of the important strategic priorities and 
determined factor for the US National Security Strategy. Therefore, US always 
follows a policy of diversification of its energy resources for securing its energy 
supply and decrease dependence from energy exporting countries. In this regard, 
right after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, US began to perceive the Caspian 
region as one of the primary directions for its global energy demand. However, it is 
important to mention that main energy consumption of US comes from Canada and 
Gulf of Mexico. Hereby, the energy policy that US pursuits in the Caspian region is 
due to the energy security of European Union, the most significant political and 
economic partner of the US in global politics, and preserve its dominant position in 
global energy policy. Hence, Jeff Smith note that “Washington understands full 
well that a Europe beholden to Russia for light and heat is more inclined to follow 
Moscow’s lead when United States and Russian interests collide” (2009). The EU, 
as one of the largest energy importer, consumes more than 80% of its oil and 57% 
gas (Lupu, 2009: p.9). Russia and Middle East are the main energy providers of the 
EU. Statistics show that by 2007 EU was consuming around 30% of its oil and 
more than 50% of its gas supplies from Russia. Additionally, most of the Eastern 
European countries fully depend on the Russian gas export for the next two 
decades Middle East countries and Russia will be main EU energy suppliers 
(Baran, 2007: p. 132). According to the estimation of European Commission:  
...By 2030, because of growing energy demand and declining domestic production, 
Europe will rely on imports for two-thirds of its energy needs. Dependence on 
imported oil will remain extremely high, reaching 94 percent in 2030. Dependence 
on imported gas will rise to 84 percent in 2030, and imports of solid fuels are 
projected to reach 59 percent in 2030 (Lupu, 2009: p. 10). 
It is obvious that in the Caspian region is not the largest energy sources and it is not 
easily accessible. In this sense, US interest in the Caspian region perceived as more 
political than economic in order to decrease the influence of Russia and Middle 
East energy producing countries in the energy policy of the EU, made a 
diversification of its energy sources as a top priority and ensure transportation of 
the Caspian region energy resources to the European market without passing via 
Russian and Iranian territory. Concerning this, US Energy Secretary Bill 
Richardson remarked in 1998 that, “this is about America’s energy security, which 
depends on diversifying our sources of oil and gas worldwide... We’re trying to 
move these newly independent countries toward the West... We would like to see 
them reliant on Western commercial and political interests rather than going 
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another way” (Shaffer, 2005: p. 334). Generally speaking, the US policy in the 
Caspian region is part of its global strategy to increase its regional influence and 
became global superpower in the twenty first century.  
The involvement of the large American and western energy companies to the 
energy sector of the Caspian region began right after the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union at the beginning of 1990s. In 1993, Chevron signed first agreement with the 
Kazakhstan for the exploitation of the largest Kazakh oil field, Tengiz, and began 
to increase its influence to the other energy rich Caspian region countries, 
Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan (Nikolaev, 2011: p. 52). This was followed with the 
“Deal of Century” between western oil companies and Azerbaijani government on 
20 September 1994 for the exploration of three joint offshore fields; Azeri-Chirag-
Guneshli (Karagiannis, 2002: p. 19). 
However, the exploitation of energy potential was faced with a problem due to the 
transportation of energy from the land lock Caspian region. Despite collapse of the 
Soviet Union, Russia was still controlling all pipelines that were transporting the 
region energy resources to the world market. Proceeding from this problem the US 
began to support alternative pipelines in order to bypass Russia. In this sense, the 
agreement on construction of Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, which 
officially opened in 2005, was a crucial step against the Russian policy in the 
region. George Bush, the former US president, described the completion over the 
BTC as a “monumental achievement that opens a new era in the Caspian Basin's 
development” (Nation, 2007). This was followed with the construction of 692 km 
length Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE), also called the South Caucasus Pipeline, 
which is transporting Azerbaijani gas from 2006 on to the European market (SCP 
Commissioning Commences, 2006).  
Additionally, Trans-Caspian oil and gas pipeline was proposed by western 
companies in order to transport respectively Kazakhstan oil and Turkmenistan gas 
to Azerbaijan and then to Europe. The US also supports Turkmenistan-
Afghanistan-Pakistan (TAP) gas pipeline as a tool to decrease Chinese and Russian 
monopoly on transportation route of the Caspian region. Nabucco gas pipeline is 
another US-backed proposal that considered a continuation of the South Caucasus 
Pipeline in order to bring the Caspian region natural gas to the European market 
(Nation, 2007). 
Another primary energy goal of the US in the Caspian region is to exclude Iran 
from participation in the exploitation and transportation of oil and gas of the 
region, which is the only member of Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) that borders the Caspian region countries. Iran is the 
commercially most appropriate route for transporting the Caspian region energy to 
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the world market, but while construction the BTC, US rejected to pass it through 
Iran. “Here the fear was that Iran would turn into a regional power, which could 
pose a potential military threat to Israel and compete with Turkey” (ZeynepOktav, 
2007: p. 31). 
The Caspian region has been also crucial for the US and North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization’s (NATO) military policy. Therefore, beginning from the 1990s the 
US was eager to increase its military cooperation with the regional countries within 
the framework of the Partnership for Peace (PFP) program of NATO that instructed 
to expand political and military cooperation between NATO and the Caspian region 
countries and “to enable joint operations with NATO peacekeeping and 
humanitarian missions among other functions” (Jaffe, 2001: p. 140).It was intended 
to build close military relations particularly with Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and 
Turkmenistan due to energy agreements with these countries. Respectively, in 
1996, NATO claimed that it has an intention to maintain energy deposits and export 
routes. Later, in 1998, the Caspian region was declared as a part of US military 
responsibility area (Laruelle&Peyrouse, 2009: p. 29). 
The terrorist attack on the US soil on 11 September 2001 has been a turning point 
in the US security policy toward the Caspian region. It increased the importance of 
the Caspian region in US global strategy not only in economic and energy issue but 
also for political and security manner. The region drew more attention after 
September 11 due to its proximity to Afghanistan. Following this Bush 
administration gave the priority to the counter terrorism rather than economic issue 
and began the deployment of its troops in the regional countries, which provided a 
significant bases for military and intelligence operations (Burns, 2007: p. 
30).Concerning geo-strategic position of the Caspian region in the US war in 
Afghanistan, Gennady Chufrin writes,  
There are few regions of the world that experience such a profound and lasting 
impact of the September 11 events as the Caspian region. As a result of the US -led 
anti-terrorist operation in the wake of these events by a military campaign directed 
against the Taliban regime and Al Qaeda network inneighboring Afghanistan, the 
Caspian states were deeply influenced by these developments, each of them to a 
different degree(2004: pp. 4/5). 
After 9/11 Caspian states received considerable military assistance from United 
States. For only 2002, the military assistance was about $74 million. Georgia was 
in the first place among the other Caspian region republics, got $32 million, 
followed by Uzbekistan $12 million and later Kyrgyzstan $11.6 million. The US 
also came to the decision to withdraw the Section 907 of the 1992 Freedom 
Support Act that was banning US aid to the Azerbaijan after collapse of the Soviet 
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Union. On their part, the Caspian region countries ensured the access of the US 
transport and military aircrafts to their airspace. The US received a privilege in 
Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan for settlement of the US and NATO military air bases 
in Khanabad and Manas airports respectively (Chufrin, 2004: p. 5). Establishment 
of the air bases in these countries was to maintain US air strikes against the regime 
and terrorist groups in Afghanistan. 
Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan are playing a significant role for US and NATO 
military forces in “war against terrorism” in Afghanistan. These countries have 
supplied the fuel need of US Central Command. The US and its NATO allies did 
not pay taxes for fuel that was consumed for the military use from Turkmenistan 
and Azerbaijan. According to the spokeswoman of Defense Logistics Agency: “fuel 
is exempt from local duties and taxes due to Turkmenistan's and Azerbaijan's 
participation in the NATO Partnership for Peace program”, which was signed with 
Azerbaijan and four Central Asian republics, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan in 1994 (Tynan, 2011). 
Consequently, the Caspian region has been the chessboard for the great powers 
after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and terrorist attack to Pentagon and World 
Trade Center in 2001 that altered geopolitical importance of the region and allowed 
the US to establish its presence in the southern rim of the Russia. The US possesses 
a considerable economic, political, and military presence in the region and is not 
eager to allow any great power to provide a threat to its interests.  
 
Russia: Traditional Regional Power 
The Caspian region is the traditional zone of Russian national political an 
economic interests and it has been one of the crucial player of the Caspian region 
throughout history. Comparison to other players of the New Great Game, Russia 
has the longest history of involvement in the region. Countries of the Caspian 
region, southern rim of the Russia, has been always an integral part for it nearly 
two centuries, since the above mentioned Great Game of nineteenth century 
between Imperial Russia and Great Britain until the dissolution of the Soviet Union 
in the 1990.  
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Caspian region became a crucial 
element in Russian geopolitical strategy and it was trying not to lose its political 
and economic influence and reinforce control over its lost areas. In order to regain 
the absolute control over former Soviet Empire peripheries, Russian “Near 
Abroad”, Russia has claimed the Caspian region as on of its foreign policy 
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priorities and the zone of vital Russian interests and began establish its hegemony 
over the region. The political attitude of Russia toward the Caspian region in the 
early 1990s was expressed in national Newspaper Segodnya (Today) as follows, 
“Not just oil officials and diplomats, but cultures and geopolitical orientations are 
clashing there. The status quo there will not be maintained for long. The only 
question is who will change it and to whose benefit. Only one solution can satisfy 
Russia—predominance on the Caspian” (MacDougall, 1997: p. 92). This statement 
considered as the “Russian Monroe Doctrine” that shows Russian political 
perception toward the Caspian (MacDougall, 1997: p. 92). In this regards, former 
Russian Deputy Prime Minister Boris Nemtsov expressed his concern towards the 
increasing the US interests over the region and asked Washington to remember that 
“Moscow views the region as the United States view Latin America: a backyard 
where no strangers are allowed” (Yazdani, 2006: p. 52). 
On 14 September 1995 the former president of Russia Boris Yeltsin made an 
official decree where achievements of Russian interests in the Caspian region were 
separated into the following tasks. Russia has to bring its foreign policy priorities 
and interests concerning to the Caspian region into order and get over the 
contradictory character of Russian regional policy; increase cooperation within the 
Commonwealth of Independent States and developed pro-Russian integration 
programs; identify the policy and perspectives of other great powers in the Caspian 
region; guarantee its security in the context of spreading terrorism and drug 
trafficking in the region; and control the transportation routes of hydrocarbon 
resources of the Caspian region (Kazantsev, 2008: p. 1073). But, in the 1990s 
Russian government was not able to realize its interests toward the Caspian region 
due to lack of economic and political tools. Only at the end of 1990s, when 
Vladimir Putin took the presidential post from Yeltsin, Russia began stable long-
term policy in the region (Chufrin, 2004: p. 3). 
After Putin came to power, there was a dramatic change in the Russian foreign 
policy. On 21 April 2000, he authorized a special meeting of the Russia Security 
Council, where the key government ministers and businessmen represented. The 
intention of the meeting was to reestablish credibility of Russian policy toward the 
Caspian region (Antonenko, 2004: p. 223). Consequently, Putin proclaimed the 
region as a zone of vital interest and specified increment of other powers in the 
region; constructing western backed oil and gas transmission route, like Baku-
Tibilisi-Ceyhan pipeline; and increasing western involvement in the security issues 
of the region as a threat to Russian regional hegemony and economic interests and 
urged Russian companies to involve more competition. Following this, Russian 
government began active support of the international expansion of major Russian 
companies. One of the successful step was considered the initiative to create the 
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Caspian Oil Company, which include three major energy companies, such as: 
YUKOS, LUKoil and Gazprom (Perovic, 2005: p. 64). At the consequence of the 
political transformation under Putin administration, Russia began to follow more 
stable and influential foreign policy in the Caspian region.  
However, there are number of reasons that why Russia wanted to keep the Caspian 
region under its control. It has historical and cultural link with most of the regional 
countries and shares direct border with them. Additionally, existence of Slavic 
minorities in those countries makes the region important area for Russia in terms of 
protection of its citizens (Rumer, 2006: p. 4). But, as mentioned before the primary 
concern of the Russia in the region are shaped by two distinct perspectives: 
geopolitical and security issue cover the power politics of the great powers over the 
region and transnational threats and terrorism; and energy issue which focuses on 
to ensure the flow of the Caspian region hydrocarbons through Russia to the 
European market. In the context of energy, Russian ambition in the region is to buy 
hydrocarbon resources, mainly gas, from the Caspian region - energy producing 
countries in the form of long term gas supply arrangements and guarantee of the 
flow of the Caspian energy through the Russian oil and gas pipelines (Terterov, 
2010: p. 195). It was aware that as long as it retained its monopoly over the energy 
distribution network, it would be easy to purchase the energy from the region 
countries less than market price and make a benefit while selling it to the European 
market in high price (Gorenburg, 2011). 
Additionally, Russia was eager to block the access of the European countries to the 
Caspian region energy resources. Therefore, Russia signed a long-term contract 
with the main energy producer of the region, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan in May 
2007 (Marketus, 2009: p. 3), and with Azerbaijan on 29 June 2009, during the first 
visit of Russian president Dmitry Medvedev to Azerbaijan (Socor, 2009). On the 
other hand, in order to preserve its monopolization position over the transportation 
routes Russian government is looking for a new transportation infrastructure aimed 
to prevent construction of western backed pipelines, such as Nabucco and Trans-
Caspian gas and oil pipelines, for bypassing Russia (Marketus, 2009: p. 3). It is 
obvious for the Russian government that if above-mentioned pipelines will come to 
existence it decreases the Russian control over the region and gives a chance to the 
energy producing countries of the Caspian to sell directly their production to the 
European market. Accordingly, Russia signed a trilateral agreement with the 
government of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan in 2007 for building a new pipeline, 
which will be alternative to Trans-Caspian one (Kazantsev, 2008: p. 1085). Russia 
also launched two other proposals, the Blue Stream II and South Stream, which are 
in direct competition to the Nabucco project. The former one planned to supply gas 
to the Balkans and later one intended to run under the Black Sea from Russia to 
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Bulgaria in order to transport Russian gas to Europe (Marketus, 2009: p. 3). 
Another Russian effort for preserving its existence position in the Caspian region 
energy exports was formalizing a gas cartel called the Gas Exporting Countries 
Forum (GECF) in 2008. It consists of sixteen members including the Caspian 
region countries Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan (Kurečić, 2010: p. 40).As it is 
indicated “formation of such a cartel would consolidate Russia’s dominance as a 
gas exporter, allow Russia an even larger degree of control over European energy 
supply, and would likely help Russia to manage and limit future Iranian 
competition on the European market” (Marketus, 2009: p. 3). 
Another energy interest of Russia is investing in the Caspian region countries' 
nuclear sector. Concerning this, in February 2002, Russia provided a new project to 
the Kazakhstan government for enrichment a nuclear power plant in Balkhash, 
which is situated 400 km north of Almaty. Later, in July 2006, two governments 
signed an agreement for beginning three other uranium-mining projects for not 
only domestic use, but also for export. This was followed with signing similar 
agreement between Russia and Uzbekistan for the development Uzbekistan’s 
uranium deposits. By this, Russia was trying to ensure its ambitions in the Caspian 
region. The logic was that if the production of uranium increases for the domestic 
use of those countries, the consumption of energy, particularly oil and gas will 
decrease, which provides more chance for Russia to get oil and gas easily and 
transport to the world market. On the other hand, this investment will help to 
develop Russian nuclear sector while importing cheap uranium from regional 
countries and keep them to have such an agreement with other regional powers, 
like, China, India, and Iran, which is considered as a threat to Russian national 
interest (Bhatty, 2008: pp. 51/52). 
Coming to security concern, the fragmentation off the Soviet Union forced Russia 
to reevaluate its security politics in the Caspian region, which was a melting pot of 
such complex political, ethnic, and religious disputes and was providing a potential 
risk for the Russian position in the region. The security interests of Russia in the 
region considered to build an exclusive zone over the former Soviet countries in 
order to reestablish its great power status in international arena.  
The Caspian region was also playing a buffer role against the potential threat from 
the Middle East and Afghanistan (Labben, 2009: p. 13). Therefore, Russia was 
giving great effort to build up political influence over the region while trying to 
build high level military cooperation with regional countries within the framework 
of Russian led military organizations, such as: the Collective Security Treaty 
Organization (CSTO) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). 
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With 9/11 events, the security issue of Russia entered in a new level while the 
military infiltration of the US to the region, which perceived as a direct threat to the 
Caspian region security of Russia. Russia accepted and cooperated with the US 
military presence in the Caspian region as long as both states share single interest, 
eradication of the Taliban and combating terrorism. Even Russia showed an 
intention to open its air space for non-military flight of the US (Labben, 2009: p. 
11). Political analysts emphasized several factors that why Russia was in 
cooperation with the US in its war on terrorism. First, Russia perceived that the war 
in Afghanistan ensures the block of the Caspian region from the terrorist threat of 
Middle East (Strachota, 2002: p. 128). Second, with the war in Afghanistan Russia 
caught a chance to send a positive message to the West that they face the same 
threat, which gives legitimacy to its war in the Northern Caucasus (Bhatty, 2008: p. 
56). Additionally, Russia was intended to get the sympathies of the Islamic world 
while directing their sentiments toward the US. In this regard, while supporting the 
Iraq war in 2003 Russian ultranationalist leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky clearly 
stated that, “Russia would benefit from it, as US would be weakened and while 
feeling hated for the US, the world community would look toward Russia for help” 
(Bhatty, 2008: p. 57). 
But lately the security concern of Russia increased with the length of the US 
military presence in the region. Western backed “colored revolutions” in the 
southern rim of the Russia was the pick of the Russian concerns. Therefore, it 
intended to counter the interests of the US in all meanings. While Russia was 
positioning itself in the region it began active military cooperation with the 
regional countries by the above mentioned security organizations and announced 
the establishment of 11.000 strong Rapid Reaction Force in order confront any 
challenges against the sovereignty of the members of those organizations (Smith, 
2009). 
In this perspective, Russia signed various military agreements with region 
countries in order to deploy its troops in their territories and lease their military 
bases. Around 14.000 Russian soldiers are stationed in the territory of former 
Soviet Republics, such as Armenia, Belarus, Georgia (mainly in Abkhazia and 
Ossetia), Moldova, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Ukraine. The 201st Motorized Rifle 
Division of Russia in Tajikistan is the largest Russian military base outside Russian 
territory (Bhatty, 2008: p. 52). On the other hand, it also began to influence the 
region countries to withdraw the US military bases from their territories. In this 
regards, Russia outlined a package of aid to Kyrgyzstan and began to increase its 
military presence in the Caspian region (Smith, 2009). Concerning this matter, Jim 
Nichol, a specialist in Russian and Eurasian Affairs, emphasizes: 
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During a February 3, 2009, meeting in Moscow with Russian President 
DmitriyMedvedev, Kyrgyz President KurmanbekBakiyev announced that the U.S. 
Manas airbase would be closed. Bakiyev claimed that US compensation for use of 
the base had been inadequate andthat the Kyrgyz public wanted the base to be 
closed... At the meeting, Medvedev had offered a $1.7 billion loan to Kyrgyzstan for 
building a dam and hydroelectric power station and a $300 million loan and a $150 
million grant for budget stabilization. Russia also agreed to cancel a $180 million 
debt owed by Kyrgyzstan in exchange for some properties. Many observers 
suggested that the assistance was a quid pro quo for Krygyzstan’s agreement to close 
the base... (2010: pp. 37/38). 
At the consequence of this meeting, the cancellation of the status of forced 
agreement (SOFA) between the US and Kyrgyzstan for using Manas airbase 
approved by the Kyrgyz legislature and following day the bill was signed by the 
President of Kyrgyzstan. “The SOFA between the United States and Kyrgyzstan 
calls for the airbase to be vacated within 180 days upon notification that the 
agreement is cancelled” (Nichol, 2010: p. 38). By this the main aim of Russia was 
to secure its presence in its backyard, and prevent American activities in the region 
in the context of “spread of democracy”. The Russian military intervention into 
Georgia in August 2008 was a crucial step in this perspective and led to significant 
changes in the Russian geopolitical balance and existence rules of the game in the 
region. By the Russian-Georgian war Russia made it clear that it is capable of to 
draw a line against the Western will if it possesses a threat for the Russian regional 
interests. Another side effect of the Georgian war was that it created uncertainty for 
the countries of the region, which was relying on the US support in order to prevent 
the Russian influence (Strachota&Górecki, 2008: p. 2). 
 
Russian Initiated Regional Organizations to Contain American “Hegemony” 
As mentioned above, the primary ambition of Russia in the region is to preserve its 
regional power status and impose its political and economic wills. In this regard, 
after the collapse of the Soviet Union, beside bilateral military and economic 
cooperation with the region countries Russia also intended to create new regional 
and international forums in order to keep its “Near Abroad” in sphere of influence. 
Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (SCO) are two of them that we are going to find out what are the 
essential objectives of Russia through these institutions and how it is useful for its 
regional policy.  
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Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), “New Warsaw Pact” 
Collective Security Treaty Organization originally formed on the bases of the 
Collective Security Treaty (CST) that signed between Armenia, Russia, and several 
Central Asian countries in 1992. A decade later, in April 2003, the member states of 
CST signed a charter to instruct a Collective Security Treaty Organization with a 
permanent secretariat for budget coordination and military planning. The 
Organization consist of seven member states: Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan (Mowchan, 2009: p. 1). The main 
aim of Organization is expressed in Article III of CSTO's Charter as, “the purposes 
of the Organization are to strengthen peace and international and regional security 
and stability and to ensure the collective defense of the independence, territorial 
integrity and sovereignty of the member States, in the attainment of which the 
member States shall give priority to political measures” (Charter of the Collective 
Security Treaty Organization). According to the secretary general of CSTO, 
Nikolay Bordyuzha, the aim of the Organization is “to resolve military, local and 
border conflicts, as well as to prevent ... terror acts of armed groups and to stop 
drug trafficking.... In addition, they will be used to fulfill special tasks such as 
protection of pipelines” (Nichol, 2010: p. 17). 
From 2005, Russia was putting great effort to push the Organization through more 
militarized instruction. During the meeting of Collective Security Council of CSTO 
on 22-24 June 2005 the member states adopted a decision for instructing a military 
component. The decision was made to develop an integrated air defense system and 
rapid deployment forces. The commission for military-economic cooperation of the 
Organization was instructed, which aimed to built a closer collaboration between 
military industries of member states (Kaczmarski, 2006). The reason for this 
reform within the CSTO was the intention to create a joint military structure for the 
Organization in order to protect its member states from internal and external 
threats. Following this, the member states of CSTO agreed for the establishment of 
an air-assault Collective Operational Reaction Force (CORF) in 2009. Nikolay 
Bordyuzha, the secretary general of CSTO, claimed in early 2010 that there are two 
rapid reaction forces of the Organization. The first one is composed of more than 
20.000 special operation troops, which aimed to protect “Eurasian borders and 
undertaking international mission”, while the other one, which consists of 4.000 
troops focused on defending Central Asia from the terrorist threat from Afghanistan 
and protect energy resources (Nichol, 2010: pp. 17/18).Despite above mentioned 
purposes of the Organization, many political analysts viewed the militarization of 
CSTO as a direct step against US, which is clearly expressed in a new Military 
Doctrine that released by Russian government in 2009, where NATO and the US 
were implied as main external threat for Russia. According to the Military Doctrine 
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of the main external threats of war were listed as below: 
- The goal of NATO to arrogate to itself the assumption of global functions in 
violation of international law, and to expand the military infrastructure of NATO 
nations to Russia’s borders including through expansion of the bloc 
- Attempts to destabilize the situation in individual states and regions and the 
undermining of strategic stability 
- The deployment of military contingents of foreign states (and blocs) on territories 
neighboring Russia and its allies, as well as in adjacent waters 
- The establishment and deployment of strategic missile defense systems that 
undermine global stability and violate the balance of forces in the nuclear field, as 
well as the militarization of outer space and the deployment of strategic non-nuclear 
systems precision weapons 
- Territorial claims against Russia and its allies and interference in their internal 
affairs 
- The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, missiles and missile technology, 
increasing the number of states possessing nuclear weapons 
- The violation by a state of international agreements, and failure to ratify and 
implement previously signed international treaties on arms limitation and reduction 
- The use of military force in the territories of states bordering Russia in violation of 
the UN Charter and other norms of international law 
- The escalation of armed conflicts on territories neighboring Russia and allied 
nations (Rozoff, 2010). 
 
In general, the aim of Russia for the militarization of CSTO was to create a new 
military organization similar to former Warsaw Pact and to transfer it to effective 
security institution in order to counter the outside influence, mainly the US, and to 
keep the region countries away from military mechanism of NATO, which is 
played active role in the Caspian region after 9/11 terrorist event. To put it simple, 
as emphasized in Russia’s Foreign Policy Concept announced on 17 July 2008, 
“[Russia] will promote in every possible way the Collective Security Treaty 
Organization (CSTO) as a key instrument to maintain stability and ensure security 
in the CIS area... as well as on ensuring capability of the CSTO Member States to 
take prompt and effective joint actions, and on transforming the CSTO into a 
central institution ensuring security in its area of responsibility” (Ionela Pop, 2009: 
pp. 285/286). 
 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO): Sino-Russian Rapprochement 
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization emerged as “Shanghai Five” of China, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan in 1996 in order to solve a series of 
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border disputes among the member states after the dissolution of Soviet Union. 
With the joining of Uzbekistan in 2001, it was transformed to Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization and began annual summit meeting of head of states and 
governments (Rozoff, 2009). The main aims of the SCO are preservation security 
and stability in the region, fighting against terrorism and organized crimes, 
extremism, separatism, and illegal drug trafficking and weapons trade (Strachota, 
2002: p. 119). 
On 26 April 1996, during the first summit meeting of the Organization in Shanghai, 
the member states signed a “Treaty on Deepening Military Trust in Border 
Regions” with the aim to create a military guarantee along the borders of member 
states. This was followed with the signing a “Treaty on Reduction of Military 
Forces in Border Regions” during the second leadership meeting on 25 April 1997. 
The purpose of this agreement was the restriction of conventional military 
settlement and military activities within demilitarized zone along common borders 
(Weitz, 2008). Like CSTO, the strengthening of the US and its NATO allies' 
position in the region after the US declared “war on terrorism” in Afghanistan, 
Russia began to push SCO into regional security affairs and military structure in 
order to balance US position. In this respect, during the Russian initiated SCO 
summits in Petersburg and Moscow in 2002 and 2003, the member states adopted 
the charter and the basic legal documents of the Organization, and established the 
Secretariat of SCO and a Regional Anti-Terrorist Center (RATC). The headquarters 
of these institutions were respectively in Beijing and Bishkek (Chufrin, 2004: p. 
8).In august 2007 SCO launched its large-scale military exercise, which called 
“Peace Mission 2007” and involved almost 6.500 and 80 Aircraft. The 2.000 of that 
troop consist of from Russian and 1.600 from Chinese soldiers (Weitz, 2008). 
In comparison to CSTO, the SCO represents two great regional and international 
powers, Russia and China, both share some common and separated political and 
economic interests in the region. As a short-term perspective, China is interested of 
the establishment of a single economic space within SCO. However, Russia 
concerned that such a short term perspective will result economic hegemony of 
China in the Organization and led influx of cheap Chinese manufactured products, 
which will transfer the regional countries to be dependent on China. The main 
exports of Russia to China basically consist of raw materials; on the other hand, 
China mainly exports manufactured items to Russia and regional countries. 
Another concern of Russia is the settlement of the Chinese population in the 
Russian depopulated territories in the Far East. Additionally, there are controversies 
between these states over the regional energy transportation routes and the energy 
policy of China in the Caspian region logically increases Russian anxiety. 
Therefore, Russia perceived economic integration as a long term priority of SCO 
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and mainly interested in short term goals, such as political and security cooperation 
on the fighting against terrorism, extremism, and separatism (Kazantsev, 2008: p. 
1080). 
However, when it comes to question of the US position in the region, despite 
above-mentioned disagreements, Russia and China began not only improve the 
strategic relations between each other, but also try to involve the region states. As 
Thomas S. Wilkins stresses, “this partnership is primarily founded upon a number 
of mutual interests not shared values” (Tumurkhuleg, 2008/2009: p. 81). As 
mentioned before, the campaign against international terrorism led the US military 
expansion to the Caspian region and deployment its troops in Uzbekistan and 
Kyrgyzstan and using air space of other regional states. Therefore, none of them, 
neither Russia nor China was willing to see the US and its NATO allies in their 
backyards and overshadow their national political and economic interests. Both 
countries share common interest to limit the US influence to the region as much as 
possible. In this respect, former head of the International Military Cooperation 
Directorate at the Russian Ministry of Defense Colonel-General Leonid 
Ivashovindicates, “Under conditions of NATO expansion, there is a real threat to 
national security of Russia. Hence, I am convinced that only SCO could become a 
real counterweight to expansion on the part of the North Atlantic Alliance. In the 
future, what the SCO needs to do is to admit Iran, India and Pakistan as its 
members” (Tumurkhuleg, 2008/2009: p. 62). 
The Organization gained reputation in the West with the Kazakhstan Declaration of 
SCO on 5 July 2005, when the member states called the US to set a timetable for 
withdrawing its military forces from the bases of the member states of SCO. The 
Declaration emphasized: 
We are supporting and shall continue to support the efforts by the international 
coalition, conducting anti-terrorist operation in Afghanistan. Today we are noticing 
the positive dynamics of stabilizing internal political situation in Afghanistan. A 
number of the SCO member states provided their ground infrastructure for temporary 
stationing of military contingents of some states, members of the coalition, as well as 
their territory and air space for military transit in the interest of the anti-terrorist 
operation. Considering the completion of the active military stage of anti-terrorist 
operation in Afghanistan, the member states of the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization consider it necessary, that respective members of the anti-terrorist 
coalition set a final timeline for their temporary use of the above-mentioned objects 
of infrastructure and stay of their military contingents on the territories of the SCO 
member states (Germanovich, 2008: p. 30). 
Political analysts estimated that this event would encourage Uzbekistan and 
Kyrgyzstan to expel the US military bases from the territories. General Richard 
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Myers, who became Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Stuff claimed that by this 
act Russia and China are “trying to bully” their smaller neighbors into weakening 
security ties with Washington” (Weitz, 2008: p. 68). The US analysts Ariel Cohen 
and John J. Tkacik evaluated this act as “the anti-American axis has already begun 
to work” (2005: p. 3). 
The increasing geopolitical and geo-strategic cooperation between these two states 
is not only an aspect of SCO against the US. Cooperation in energy sector is 
another sphere of influence that Russia and China are trying to balance US led 
large energy projects toward the Caspian region. Security of exploitation and 
transportation of energy resources is an important issue on which Chinese and 
Russian economic interests converge within the SCO. Respectively, there was a 
proposal to transfer SCO into energy club as “gas OPEC”, which for first time was 
officially declared by the former Russian President Vladimir Putin during the 
Shanghai summit in 2006. The idea behind this event of Russia was to keep the US 
out and China inside energy gamble in order to preserve its dominant position on 
energy policy of the Caspian region countries (Germanovich, 2008: p. 24). 
Generally speaking, all these initiations made by Russia after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union are to regain its former global power position. Around two hundred 
years Russia has been a dominant power in the Caspian region and possesses deep 
political, historical, and cultural link with the region countries. And it is obvious 
that it is not so easy to gain a dominant position in the Russian sphere of influence 
without calculating Russian interests in the region. However, coming to the Russia 
policy and Russian-led regional and international institutions, it raises a question 
that how effective are they. But if look at two decades back to history, there is a 
precise development on Russian political and economic leverage in regional and 
global affairs and Russia is not going to leave its sphere of influence.  
 
China: A Rising Global Power 
The engagement of China to the Great Game over the Caspian region began 
immediately after the dissolution of the Soviet Empire. The main interest of the 
China was in the eastern part of the Caspian region, namely Central Asia, where it 
has a direct border relationship with some of them. Therefore, it was one of the first 
countries that recognized the independence of the Central Asian countries and 
established diplomatic relationship with them in January 1992 (Liao, 2006: p. 62).  
In order to preserve its political and security interests in the region, China began to 
conduct an intensive negotiations and signed various bilateral and multilateral 
agreements on arms control, settlement of border disputes, religious extremism, 
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fighting against international terrorism and ethnic separatism, illegal immigrations, 
drug trafficking, and other forms of contract that threaten security of the region 
(Chufrin, 2001: p. 334). China considers the Caspian region as a vital zone for its 
economic interests, sources of the cheap raw materials, and big market for its 
productions. For that reason, as soon as China entered to the Great Game it has 
established a tread mission in every countries of the region and began to involve to 
the Caspian energy policy with the gradual development of oil and gas sector in 
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. According to the article published in 
New York Times, “Chinese officials see Central Asia as a critical frontier for their 
nation’s energy security, trade expansion, ethnic stability and military defense. 
State enterprises have reached deep into the region with energy pipelines, railroads 
and highways...”(Wong, 2011).In this respect, Liu Yazhou, General of the People's 
Liberation Army considered Central Asia as “the thickest piece of cake given to the 
modern Chinese by the heavens” (Wong, 2011).  
However, the involvement of China in the Caspian region was not only for the 
energy resources, but also to ensure security of its western border. Thus, this part of 
research paper will focus on the two primary factors of Chinese policy in the 
Caspian region: the security of energy supplies for rapidly growing economy of 
China and suppress the separatist movement in its Xinjiang province that threaten 
its security, which has a ethnic relationship with Central Asian countries. The 
process of industrialization of China made energy security as one of the priority in 
China's Caspian region strategic question. At the consequence of the increasing 
dependence from the external energy supplies, China became a net importer of the 
oil. Between 1985 and 1995, the oil demand of China increased from 1.7 to 3.4 
million barrels per day (bpd). By 2005 this proportion reached 6.8 million bpd and 
2.45 million bpd (around 40 percent of Chinese oil needs) of that demand was 
imported. The volume of the crude oil import increased more than 50% in 2009 and 
exceeded domestic production (Lonela Pop, 2010: p. 200). With surpassing Japan 
in 2004, China became the second largest importer of petroleum after the US. The 
demand for the petroleum import was increasing due to the rapid economic growth 
(Xuetang, 2006: p. 129). The report from Paris-based International Energy Agency 
by surpassing the US in August 2010, China became the first energy consumer of 
the world. According to this report, “China consumed 2.252 billion tons of oil 
equivalents in 2009—about 4% more than the United States, which consumed 
2.170 billion tons of oil equivalents” (Lin, 2011: p. 3). 
The growing energy needs of China increased its interest toward the Caspian 
region energy affairs, mainly the eastern part of the Caspian region. As a world 
number one energy consumer, China imports more than two-thirds of its oil from 
the Middle East. Chinese policy makers are aware that the vulnerable Middle East 
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energy resources are not reliable due to military conflicts, terrorism, and other 
sources of instability, which may cause abrupt cutting of energy export of China 
from the region. Around 80 percent of Chinese imports from the Middle East pass 
through Malacca Strait, which is under the threat of the US naval forces.  China is 
afraid that in case of any conflict it would be easy for the US to impose a naval 
blockade on Malacca Strait for disrupting Chinese energy supplies (Lin, 2011: p. 
10). Therefore, due to above mentioned factors, China is trying to diversify its 
energy imports and reduce its dependence from the Middle East. The Caspian 
region, which possesses rich oil and gas reserves, seems to play an important role 
in this respect. “A stake in oil and gas fields in Kazakhstan, Iran, and potentially 
Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan and the Caspian is extremely valuable to the Chinese 
government, which has put much effort into realizing this” (Swanström, 2007). In 
this regard, Chinese leadership are pushing strongly to involve the Caspian region 
energy affairs and develop land based secured energy pipelines.  
China began its full energy policy toward the Caspian region in the late 1990s. In 
1997, China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) signed a deal with the 
Kazakhstan government for buying 60% in AktobeMunayGas (Lonela Pop, 2010: 
p. 206). Following this, by 1998, two governments signed an agreement for the 
exploration of Western Kazakhstan oil field (Kaliyeva, 2004: p. 6). In 2002, CNPC 
acquired 50% in Salejan field in Kazakhstan. CNPC acquired 35% of oil and gas 
field of North Buzachi in August 2003 and obtained the 65% of that field two 
month later from Chevron. In 2004, another Chinese corporation Sinopec bought 
American First International Oil Company (FIOC) and acquired its user licenses in 
small fields like Mezhdurechensk, Sagiz, Begaidar, Sazankurak, Federov (Lonela 
Pop, 2010: p. 207). One of the Chinese successes in Kazakhstan was signing a 
contract with the Kazakhstan for taking over the PetroKazakhstan (Petrokaz), an 
international petroleum company that registered in Canada (Fu, 2010: p. 19). In 
November 2007, KazMunayGaz, Kazakhstan National Oil and Gas Company 
signed an export deal with CNPC for exporting 5 bcm of gas to China, annually. In 
November 2009, CNPC and KazMunayGas together bought 100% of 
MangistauMunaiGas shares (Lonela Pop, 2010: p. 207).In order to transport 
Kazakhstan oil Chinese government invested billion of dollars since 2004 in order 
to build pipeline that will link Kazakhstan with the western part of China, Xinjiang 
(Pham, 2006: p. 57). The Kazakhstan-Chinese oil pipeline Atasu-Alashankou was 
opened in December 2005. After the construction of this pipeline China began a 
negotiation with other Central Asian countries for the additional pipelines and 
suggested “Atasu-Alashankou pipeline will only be the first among many Central 
Asia-China pipelines”. Following this, in 2006, China claimed its interest for the 
construction of a natural gas pipeline from Kazakhstan parallel to Atasu-
Alashankou oil pipeline (Blank, 2006). For linking China to the Caspian fields of 
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Kazakhstan, in August 2007, CNPC signed a contract with KazMunaiGaz for 
extending the Atasu-Alashankou oil pipeline 700 km westward (Makretos, 2009: p. 
7). With construction of the Kenkiyak-Kumkol section the main energy 
transportation infrastructure between two countries Kazakhstan-China oil pipeline 
was put into operation in July 2009 with the capacity of 20 million tonnes per year 
(Lin, 2011: p. 7). 
Energy cooperation between China and Turkmenistan also began at the last decade 
of the twentieth century. In 1992, CNPC and Mitsubishi came with a proposal for 
exporting Turkmenistan gas to China. With joining of Exxon in 1995, these 
companies agreed for a feasibility study and completed it in 1996 (Lonela Pop, 
2010: p 207). Two years later, in April 2006, two governments signed a contract in 
order to deliver 30 bcm of gas from Turkmenistan to China from 2009 to 2039 
(Niazi, 2006: p. 113). Next year, China signed a production sharing agreement with 
Turkmenistan for development ant extraction natural gas in the Bagtiyarlik field of 
eastern Turkmenistan (Lonela Pop, 2010: p. 207).In 2009, China provided around 
$4 billion loan to the Turkmenistan government in order to develop country's South 
Yolotan gas fields. Accordingly, Turkmenistan promised to increase the amount of 
exported natural gas 10 bcm, additionally to an annual 30 bcm that came to 
agreement before (Socor, 2009).  
China signed a contract with the Turkmenistan for completion of Turkmenistan-
China gas pipeline during the visit of Turkmenistan President SapirmuradNiyazov 
to China in April 2006 (Niazi, 2006: p. 114). In December 2009, CNPC completed 
the longest natural gas pipeline, 7,000 km, across Central Asia to Turkmenistan. 
China’s largest oil and gas producer and supplier, CNPC, financed the pipeline. 
This pipeline creates a chance for China to pick up an additional gas from other gas 
producing countries of Central Asia. The Turkmenistan-China pipeline consist of 
two pipelines, the first one opened in December 2009 is 1,833 km that begins from 
Turkmenistan to Xinjiang province of Chine, passing through Uzbekistan and 
Kazakhstan. From there on, it connects to the domestic pipeline network of China 
that travels 7,000 km (Blank, 2010: p. 10). 
China also conducts various energy deals with Uzbekistan. During the visit of 
ofHuJintao to Uzbekistan in 2004, the CNPC signed an agreement for oil and gas 
cooperation with Uzbekistan National Holding Company, Uzbekneftegaz. Two 
years later, the sides signed additional two contract in order to develop and explore 
energy deposits in 5 onshore blocks of the Aral Sea, together with other companies, 
such as: Lukoil from Russia, Petronas from Malaysia, and South Korea's National 
Oil Corporation (Liao, 2006: p. 67). On 30 June 2008, the construction of the first 
phase gas pipeline (third stage of the Turkmenistan-China Pipeline) that valued 
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more than 2 billion dollar began from Uzbekistan to China. AsiaTransGas, a joint 
venture between Uzbekistan and China, was also founded in order to design, 
construct and operate the pipeline construction. According to the oil and gas 
agreement between these two countries that signed before, Chinese energy 
companies began to refine oil and gas in Uzbekistan energy fields, where they 
posses preferential access to wells while drilling is complete (Khodzhaev, 2009: p. 
19). According to AblatKhodzhaev, a senior researcher in the Academy of Science 
of Uzbekistan, “these projects will give China direct access to oil and gas deposits 
in Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, in addition to Azerbaijan and Iran, and will fulfill 
these countries’ willingness to sell their energy directly to China regardless of 
Russia” (2009: p. 19). 
The energy cooperation of China with Iran also plays a crucial role in China's 
energy policy toward the Caspian region due to the geographical location of Iran, 
which has a direct border with both the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf. Because 
of that fact, between 2005 and 2010 Chinese energy companies signed several 
agreements with Iran that valued approximately $120 billion. Cooperation with 
Iran viewed as strategic ally for countering the US supported Arab countries in 
order to preserve its energy interests in Persian Gulf. China is also interested in to 
construct pipelines, railways, and roads, which will link China directly to Iran and 
allow it to import oil and gas resources of Iran via secured transportation 
infrastructure in case of any conflict in Persian Gulf (Lin, 2011: pp. x/7). 
However, secured energy supply is not the only concern of China in the Caspian 
region. The security of its western flank is one of the primary factors that pushed 
China into Central Asia after gaining independence of regional countries with the 
collapse of Soviet Union. China concerned about Stability in the region due to 
sharing 3,300 km long borders with three Caspian region countries; Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, and Taajikistan (Liao, 2006: p. 62). The uprising of Uyghur Turks in 
its western border, which was aimed to create an independent Eastern Turkestan in 
Xinjiang province of China and spread of radical movements under the Taliban 
regime in Afghanistan increased China's security concerns. China scared that 
existence of the Uyghur minorities in these countries may push them to help the 
secessionist movement. Concerning this Lena Jonson indicates that, “the presence 
of Uighur minorities in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan creates a link 
between Xinjiang and these states and further to Afghanistan, where the Taliban 
regime is considered the main source of instability in the wider region” (2001: p. 
21).Thus, the main goal of China in the region is the stabilize the unrest in Xinjiang 
region, where approximately 60 percent of population are Muslim Uyghurs that 
share ethnic, religious, cultural, and linguistic link with the region countries (Jafar, 
2004: p. 192), and provide security in its border against the external threats. 
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Proceeding from this concerns China has turned toward a Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (SCO), which we talked about previous chapter, as a main instrument 
to ensure its security and impose its interests in the region. According to Christina 
Lin, China's objective in SCO is to meet three main goals: “(1) pacifying the 
restive Xinjiang province, home to significant Muslim-Uyghur separatist forces, 
(2) diversifying energy sources from the Persian Gulf and hedging against any 
maritime embargoes, and (3) projecting Chinese hegemony across Eurasia” (2011: 
p. x). Regarding to the China's security interests in SCO, Gennady Chufrin in his 
tern elucidates that, “Participation in the forum enhanced China’s role in regional 
security affairs considerably, paving the way for a strengthening of its military and 
security cooperation with the regional states on a multilateral and also a bilateral 
basis” (2001: p. 334). 
Another security issue that concerns China is the growing influence of the US in 
the eastern part of the Caspian region after 9/11 terrorist attack and sees it as a 
direct threat to its national security and economic interests in the region. Therefore 
it uses all possible ways to contain spread of US influence in Central Asia. 
However, like Russia, due the presence of terrorist organization next to its border 
China gave its support to “the US war against terrorism”. Because, China concern 
that these organization may help Uyghur's separatist movement and train them to 
attack Chinese assets in Xinjiang (Lin, 2011: p. xiii). Moreover, China uses the US 
war in Afghanistan as a pretext to justify its war on Uyghur Turks as Russia did it 
in Chechnya (Jafar, 2004: p. 192). 
 
Conclusion 
Coming to concluding remark, the scope of this research is to show the significance 
of the Caspian region and to analyze confrontation of the above-mentioned three 
global powers in this region. The Caspian region has been a significant focal point 
for the political interests of China, Russia, and the United States of America due to 
its geo-economic and geo-strategic value after the dissolution of the Soviet Block 
in 1990. But it is important to mention that the importance of this region goes back 
into the history and various empires had been given a great effort to keep this 
region in their hands throughout history. The strategic and political significance of 
the region finds its logical frame in Mackinder's famous Heartland theory. 
Beginning from nineteenth century the region has been a battleground between 
Russia and Great Britain in order to be a dominant power in this region. Various 
scholars marked this event as a “Great Game”, which has been resulted with the 
domination of Eurasian Heartland by Russia nearly two hundred years ago. With 
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the collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of the twentieth century and decrease of 
the Russian influence, new global powers involved into a political rivalry over this 
region in order to have an access to the rich raw materials and impose their 
political wills over the weak regional countries. Therefore, the analogy has been 
drawn between the nineteenth century “Great Game” and today's rivalry between 
US, Russia, and China, and pointed this power confrontation as a “New Great 
Game”. Therefore, the aim of this research paper was analyzing what political 
gamble has been played by these three powers and shows how influential are them 
in order to preserve their national interests. The US, as a leading global power and 
China play a crucial role in the political and economic affairs of the region 
countries. However, it should be mentioned that despite the growing commercial 
and political presence of these two powers, Russia is still a major regional power 
and has a prominent impact not only in economic and political issue but also in 
cultural perspective and consider this region as its sphere of influence and a buffer 
zone against threats to its security and is going to keep this region by using all 
possible ways.  
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Summary 
 
The “New Great Game” Over the Caspian Region: Russia, the USA, and 
China in the Same Melting Pot 
 
Shamkhal Abilov 
 
Researcher 
 
Ever since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Caspian region has been transformed 
into the battleground and the power confrontations of the world major leading countries not 
only because of its geo-strategic position in the map of the Eurasia, but also because of its 
immense hydrocarbon resources. The geographical location of the Caspian region and 
possessing vast amount of oil and gas resources led it to play a significant role in world 
energy security and drew the attention of the regional and global players in order to 
increase their stocks in exploitation and transportation of Caspian hydrocarbon. The 
discovery of big amount of oil and gas in the Caspian led the Western politicians to project 
the Caspian region as a ―New Middle Eastǁ.Therefore, the scope of this research paper is 
to evaluate the geo-strategic significance of the Caspian region and its role as a crucial link 
between East and West, as well as examine the geopolitical rivalry over the vast Caspian 
region hydrocarbons and the transportation routes (pipeline politics) between the three 
global powers; Russia, the United States, and China. Lately, it will analyze what policies do 
these big states pursue in order to impose their political influence and ensuring economic 
benefits.  
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